




CONSTITUTIONAL IN NAME:  THE BUREAU OF CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S 




On July 22, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“the 
Act”), enacting what many consider to be the most sweeping changes 
to the United States financial regulatory system since the Great De-
pression.  One of the hallmarks of the Act was its creation of the Bu-
reau of Consumer Financial Protection (the “Bureau”), an indepen-
dent agency housed within the Federal Reserve, designed to serve as a 
watchdog for purchasers of consumer financial services.  One of the 
clearest descriptions of the Bureau’s task of “consumer protection” 
can be gleaned from an anecdote by Elizabeth Warren, the conceiver 
of the idea for an agency dedicated to consumer financial protection 
and the Administration’s former “advisor” for the establishment of 
the Bureau: 
It is impossible to buy a toaster that has a one-in-five chance of bursting 
into flames and burning down your house.  But it is possible to refinance 
an existing home with a mortgage that has the same one-in-five chance of 
putting the family out on the street—and the mortgage won’t even carry 
a disclosure of that fact to the homeowner . . . . Why are consumers safe 
when they purchase tangible consumer products with cash, but when 
they sign up for routine financial products like mortgages and credit 
cards they are left at the mercy of their creditors?1 
Put in these terms, it is difficult to imagine any politician arguing 
against the intended objectives of the Bureau.  Despite how much 
consumer protection may sound like a goal worthy of bipartisan sup-
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 1 Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J., Summer 2007, at 8, 
http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/5/Warren.pdf. 
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port, however, the structure and mere existence of the Bureau have 
been the subject of much partisan controversy.  For example, since 
the enactment of Dodd-Frank, Republicans in the House of Repre-
sentatives have introduced at least four bills aimed at limiting the Bu-
reau’s powers,2 and numerous Republican Senators have threatened 
to filibuster the appointment of a permanent Bureau director.3 
In response to this controversy, I seek in this Comment, as a pre-
liminary matter, to clarify two points of apparent confusion among 
Bureau opponents:  (1) despite the objections directed at the Act for 
endowing the Bureau with too much power and discretion, the Act is 
within the bounds of the Supreme Court’s nondelegation doctrine; 
and (2) despite the failure of President Obama to seek Senate con-
firmation for his appointment of Elizabeth Warren, the appointment 
did satisfy the requirements of the Court’s Appointments Clause doc-
trine.  Notwithstanding this defense of the Bureau, however, the 
Comment ultimately seeks to establish that, despite the constitutional 
shelter the Administration may have found under our sometimes 
convoluted administrative law doctrines, the Act and the appoint-
ment of Warren raise significant questions as to whether the Adminis-
tration is seriously interested in adhering to the spirit of the law ra-
ther than simply the letter of it. 
Although hard to define, the “spirit of the law” is of fundamental 
importance to a well-functioning government.  Since no court can ar-
ticulate a doctrine so detailed as to distinguish perfectly every viola-
tion of the law from every non-violation, the public must be able to 
trust that its elected officials will endeavor to act in accordance with 
the broader purposes of the law.  A government that seeks loopholes 
in the constitutional doctrines developed to regulate it will find itself 
with insufficient credibility to fault private actors for similarly exploit-
ing loopholes in the laws and regulations that they are subject to.  It is 
in this regard that criticism of the Bureau is justified, and future ad-
ministrations have much to learn from. 
I begin in Part II of this Comment by providing perspective into 
the economic and political environment that led to the establishment 
of the Bureau.  In Part III, I describe the Court’s nondelegation doc-
trine and explain that while the Bureau may satisfy the requirements 
of one version of the doctrine, formed from a survey of case out-
 
 2 See infra note 23. 
 3 Ylan Q. Mui, GOP Senators Vow to Block CFPB Nominee, WASH. POST, May 5, 2011, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/gop-senators-vow-to-block-cfpb-
nominee/2011/05/05/AFG70f2F_story.html (describing Republican senators’ vow to 
“block any nominee to lead the . . . Consumer Financial Protection Bureau”). 
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comes, the Bureau in many ways seems to fail the requirements of a 
second version, synthesized directly from statements made by various 
justices in recent cases involving nondelegation issues.  Finally, in 
Part III, I describe the Court’s Appointment’s Clause doctrine and 
apply it to the appointment of Elizabeth Warren, concluding that the 
undefined nature of the powers granted to Warren during her tenure 
with the Bureau is itself indicative of the Administration’s willingness 
to stray from the spirit of the law, and arguing for an interpretation 
of the Act that would have restricted these powers to mostly adminis-
trative functions. 
II.  THE FINANCIAL CRISIS & THE ENACTMENT OF DODD-FRANK 
An analysis of the Bureau and its powers would be incomplete 
without an explanation of the economic and political events that led 
to its creation.  As a context for understanding the importance of the 
“spirit of the law,” I also seek to highlight in this section the conse-
quences that can occur when the private sector fails to adhere to it. 
During the final three months of 2007, growth of U.S. gross do-
mestic product decreased on a quarterly basis for the first time since 
2001.4  The effects of the financial crisis correlating with this reces-
sion have been felt by nearly every American household and explana-
tions for its timing have been the subject of much scholarly writing.5  
Between 1997 and 2006, the price of the average American home in-
creased by 124%.6  While during the period from 1981 to 2001 the 
national median home price ranged between 2.9 to 3.1 times median 
household income, in 2004 this ratio rose to 4.0 and by 2006 it had 
climbed as high as 4.6.7  The risk associated with reliance on these in-
creases in property value spread from the confines of the balance 
 
 4 U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT:  
PERCENT CHANGE FROM PRECEDING PERIOD (2011), available at http://www.bea.gov/
national/xls/gdpchg.xls. 
 5 For background information on the subject, please see the following materials:  JOHN B. 
FOSTER & FRED MAGDOFF, THE GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS:  CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
(2009); ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION:  HOW TODAY’S GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2008); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL:  
AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010); BARRY 
WITHOLTZ WITH AARON TISK, BAILOUT NATION, WITH NEW POST-CRISIS UPDATE:  HOW 
GREED AND EASY MONEY CORRUPTED WALL STREET AND SHOOK THE WORLD ECONOMY 
(2009). 
 6 CSI:  Credit Crunch, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 18, 2007), http://www.economist.com/node/
9972489. 
 7 Ben Steverman & David Bogoslaw, The Financial Crisis Blame Game, BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 
18, 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/print/investor/content/oct2008/pi20081017_
950382.htm. 
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sheets of depository institutions to that of the broader macroecono-
my, as mortgage-backed securities became increasingly popular with-
in the financial services industry.  As was inevitable, the bubble even-
tually burst and by 2008 housing prices had declined by over 20% 
from their mid-2006 peak.8  The resulting havoc was felt in economic, 
social, and political terms. 
During 2007, lenders began foreclosure proceedings on nearly 
1.3 million properties, a 79% increase over 2006,9 and by 2008 this 
number increased to 2.3 million.10  By August 2008, 9.2% of all U.S. 
mortgages outstanding were either delinquent or in foreclosure,11 
and by September 2009, this number had risen to 14.4%.12  In 2009, 
the IMF calculated that major U.S. and European banks had lost 
more than $1 trillion on toxic assets and bad loans from January 2007 
to September 2009 and estimated that the losses would top 
$2.8 trillion for the period from 2007–2010.13  During this period, 
numerous institutions of systemic importance to the U.S. economy 
declared bankruptcy, were acquired under duress, or were rescued by 
the government—including Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill 
Lynch, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, and AIG.14 
 
 8 Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, National Trend of Home Price Declines Continues 
Through the Third Quarter of 2008 According to the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price In-
dices (Nov. 25, 2008), available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/
CSHomePrice_Release_112555.pdf. 
 9 Press Release, RealtyTrac, U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increases 75 Percent in 2007 (Jan. 29, 
2008), available at http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/us-foreclosure-
activity-increases-75-percent-in-2007-3604?accnt=64847. 
 10 Press Release, RealtyTrac, U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increases 81 Percent in 2008 (Jan. 15, 
2009), available at http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/foreclosure-activity-
increases-81-percent-in-2008-4551?accnt=64847. 
 11 Late 2000s Financial Crisis, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Late-
2000s_financial_crisis (last visited Sept. 9, 2011) (citing Press Release, Mortgage Bankers 
Ass’n, Delinquencies and Foreclosures Increase in Latest MBA National Delinquency Sur-
vey (Sept. 5, 2008), available at http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/
64769.htm). 
 12 Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, Delinquencies Continue to Climb in Latest MBA 
National Delinquency Survey (Nov. 19, 2009), available at http://www.mbaa.org/
NewsandMedia/PressCenter/71112.htm. 
 13 David Cutler, Steve Slater & Elinor Comlay, Factbox–U.S., European Bank Writedowns, Credit 
Losses, REUTERS, (Nov. 5, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/idCNL55415562009
1105. 
 14  Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Citigroup Buys Bank Operations of Wachovia, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/30/business/30bank.html; The Fed 
Bails Out AIG, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept 16, 2008), 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/sep2008/db20080916_387203.
htm?chan=top+news_top+news+index+-+temp_top+story (reporting the “emergency 
loan” extended to AIG by the government); Christopher Scinta & Tiffany Kary, WaMu 
Files for Bankruptcy Following FDIC Seizure (Update2), BLOOMBERG (Sept. 27, 2008), 
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In October 2008, in an attempt to prevent what was perceived to 
be the next “Great Depression,” President Bush signed into law the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, authorizing the Secretary of 
the Treasury to spend up to $700 billion to purchase distressed assets 
and make capital injections into the banking system.15  At the same 
time, the Federal Reserve began using its powers to make emergency 
loans to companies ranging from Bank of America and Goldman 
Sachs to non-financial institutions like Verizon and McDonalds.16  
Perhaps the most significant statistic, however, was the change in the 
nation’s unemployment rate:  rising from 4.7% in September of 2007, 
to a high of 10.1% in October of 2009.17 
The economy weighed heavily on the minds of voters in the 2008 
election, with 62% citing it as their top issue in deciding which can-
didate to cast their ballot for.18  The election brought a Democratic 
majority in both houses of Congress, and ushered in Democratic no-
minee Barack Obama as the new President.  It is with this backdrop 
that Dodd-Frank was enacted.  After numerous measures designed to 
help stabilize the economy, including a continuation of the Trouble 
Assets Relief Program (“TARP”) established during the Bush Admin-
istration, a stimulus package estimated at the time to cost $825 bil-
lion, and a “bailout” of the auto industry, the Administration shifted 
focus to putting in place regulations to ensure that a similar econom-
ic precipice would never again be reached. 
Economists and politicians have disagreed on what the precise 
causes of the crisis were, but it is clear that the surge in subprime 
 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aG.D1cUCF5zU (report-
ing Washington Mutual’s bankruptcy filing); Andrew Ross Sorkin & Landon Thomas Jr., 
J.P. Morgan Acts to Buy Bear Stearns at Huge Discount, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/business/16cnd-bear.html; Andrew Ross Sorkin, 
Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill is Sold, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html?pagewanted=all (re-
porting Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing and Bank of America’s purchase of Merill 
Lynch).   
 15 See Economic Rescue Swiftly Signed Into Law, AFP, Oct. 3, 2008, http://afp.google.com/
article/ALeqM5h40yrrEcqeJEeVRgcrDXB7egDo2A (detailing the 700-billion-dollar Wall 
Street bailout). 
 16 See Luca Di Leo & Maya Jackson Randall, Fed Data Show Firms on the Brink, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 1, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870459480457564874094
8074042.html (“Apart from banks, the Fed also bought short-term debt from McDonalds 
Corp., Verizon Communications, Inc., Harley-Davidson Inc., and state-owned Korea De-
velopment Bank.”). 
 17 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE 
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (2011), available at http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/
SurveyOutputServlet?series_id=LNS14000000. 
 18 David P. Kuhn, Exit Polls:  Economy Top Issue, POLITICO (Nov. 5, 2008), http://www.
politico.com/news/stories/1108/15270.html. 
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loans was at the heart of it.  Although some have placed primary 
blame for the spread of such loans on government enterprises like 
Fannie Mae19 or on the Federal Reserve,20 it is difficult to dispute that 
predatory lending by banks and brokers played a large role in ex-
acerbating it.  Evidence of this included charges against Countrywide 
Home Loans that ended up resulting in what was the largest predato-
ry lending settlement in U.S. history—$8.4 billion.21  In the words of 
then-California Attorney General Jerry Brown, Countrywide had 
“turned the American dream into a nightmare.”22  With this type of 
fraud in mind, Bureau proponents saw the establishment of a con-
sumer financial protection agency as a critical piece of any legislation 
overhauling the financial system.23  Finally, on July 22, 2010, following 
a Senate vote on the Act attracting the support of only three Republi-
cans, Dodd-Frank was signed into law and the Bureau was estab-
lished.24 
While this recap of the financial crisis is on one hand intended to 
provide the reader with an understanding of the Administration’s 
reasons for creating the Bureau and endowing it with the controver-
sial range of powers that will be discussed in the following section, it 
also serves as an example of what can occur when the application of 
the law is divorced from the spirit of it.  As mentioned above, one 
 
 19 See, e.g., Peter J. Wallison, What Got Us Here?, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC 
POLICY RESEARCH (Dec. 9, 2008), http://www.aei.org/article/29047 (stating that “the 
most persuasive case for the cause of the financial crisis is the U.S. government itself” and 
claiming that “with [the] financial incentives for homeowners, banks and other mortgage 
lenders--easy lending terms and a ready market for mortgages through Fannie [Mae] and 
Freddie [Mac]--a housing bubble was inevitable”).   
 20 See, e.g., John B. Taylor, How Government Created the Financial Crisis, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (Feb. 9, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123414310280561945.html 
(“[m]onetary excesses were the main cause of the boom.  The Fed held its target interest 
rate, especially in 2003-2005, well below known monetary guidelines that say what good 
policy should be based on historical experience.  Keeping interest rates on the track that 
worked well in the past two decades, rather than keeping rates so low, would have pre-
vented the boom and the bust.”).  
 21 See Gretchen Morgenson, Countrywide to Set Aside $8.4 Billion in Loan Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
5, 2008, at B1 (stating that Countrywide Financial agreed to the “largest program ever to 
modify home loans”). 
 22 Id. 
 23 See, e.g., U.S. Rep. Maxine Waters, Statement on the Need for a Consumer Financial Protection 
Agency, HOUSE.GOV (Jul. 20, 2009), http://waters.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.
aspx?DocumentID=140725 (“Another reason we need a consumer financial protection 
agency is to protect consumers from complicated products and hidden and predatory 
fees.”). 
   24       Brian Montopoli, Obama Signs Sweeping Financial Reform Into Law, CBS NEWS (July 21, 
2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20011201-503544.html (reporting the 
signing of the Act and the limited Republican support for it).   
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target of blame for the crisis were the banks and other financial insti-
tutions that originated the complex set of instruments that have been 
seen as its cause.  While some institutions like Countrywide have been 
charged with actual violations of the law, a much broader array have 
been accused of exploiting holes in the financial regulatory scheme.25  
Those who might trivialize the idea of the “spirit of the law” should 
keep in mind while reading the following sections that if as a society 
we cannot expect our government to adhere to anything greater than 
the “letter of the law,” certainly we can not expect private corpora-
tions to do so either. 
III.  THE BUREAU & THE NON-DELEGATION PRINCIPLE 
Among the objections levied against Dodd-Frank are complaints 
that the Bureau it has created is too large, powerful, and immune 
from oversight, and has been granted too much of a free reign to 
write and enforce rules without specific Congressional guidance.  In 
fact, since Dodd-Frank’s enactment, Republicans in the House of 
Representatives have introduced at least four bills aimed at altering 
the Bureau’s powers and structure.26  Exemplary of its critics is Sena-
tor Richard Shelby, who has complained that “the bill has delegated 
to bureaucrats the authority to devise dozens, if not hundreds, of new 
rules for our financial system . . . provid[ing] no specific guidance in 
any number of areas, including . . . consumer protection and systemic 
 
 25 See Vigal V. Acharya et al., Market Failures and Regulatory Failures:  Lessons From Past and 
Present Financial Crises 12 (ADBI Working Paper Series No. 264, 2011), available at 
http://www.adbi.org/files/2011.02.08.wp264.market.regulatory.failures.lessons.gfc.pdf 
(“In the crisis of 2007–2009, financial firms managed to shift risk by exploiting loopholes 
in regulatory capital requirements to take an undercapitalized, US$2- to 3-trillion, highly 
leveraged, one-way asymmetric bet on the economy, particlarly tied to residential real es-
tate but also to commercial real estate and other consumer credit exposures.”); Jeremy C. 
Stein, Securitization, Shadow Banking, and Financial Fragility 6 (May 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/stein/files/
SecuritizationShadowBankingAndFragilityRevised.pdf (“[B]anks were exploiting a regu-
latory loophole:  if they held the loans directly on their balance sheets, they faced a regu-
latory capital requirement . . . but if the loans were securitized and parked in an off-
balance-sheet vehicle . . . the regulatory capital requirement was much reduced.”). 
 26 See, e.g., H.R. 1121, 112th Cong. (2011) (amending Dodd-Frank so as to “replace the Di-
rector of the Bureau . . . with a five person Commission”); H.R. 1315, 112th Cong. (2011) 
(amending Dodd-Frank so as to “strengthen the review authority of the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council of regulations issued by the Bureau; H.R. 1640, 112th Cong. (2011) 
(amending Dodd-Frank so as to “bring the Bureau . . . into the regular appropriations 
process . . . ”); H.R. 1667, 112th Cong. (2011) (amending Dodd-Frank so as “postpone 
the date for the transfer of functions to the Bureau . . . if the Bureau does not yet have a 
Director in place”).  
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risk.”27  Shelby has alleged that “[i]n many instances, Dodd-Frank has 
outsourced this [Banking] [C]ommittee’s responsibilities to un-
elected bureaucrats.”28  Similarly, upon reviewing the initial proposal 
by Senator Christopher Dodd for the legislation creating the Bureau, 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce complained that it “[did not] like 
the vagueness that Dodd’s proposal uses in saying that the Bureau 
could enforce actions against firms who engage in ‘abusive’ practic-
es,” as it “wonders what ‘abusive’ means.”29  In analyzing the merits of 
these types of complaints, a natural starting point is determining 
whether the Bureau is in compliance with the constitutional doctrine 
designed to quell such worries—the nondelegation principle. 
In Part A of this section, I provide an overview of the principle 
and its history, concluding that today there are two versions of the 
doctrine, one formed from a survey of case outcomes, and the second 
synthesized directly from statements made by various justices in re-
cent cases involving nondelegation issues.  In Part B, I provide an 
overview of the Bureau’s structure and powers, as relevant to the 
nondelegation analysis.  Finally, in Part C, I argue that while it is un-
likely that the Supreme Court would strike down the Bureau as un-
constitutional, there are several features of the Bureau that seem to 
violate the spirit of the nondelegation principle. 
A. The Doctrine and its History 
While the nondelegation principle can be explained as merely a 
facet of the broader idea of the separation of powers, its roots can be 
more specifically traced back to John Locke, who famously wrote in 
his Second Treatise of Government that 
the legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other 
hands; for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have 
it cannot pass it over to others. . . . [T]he power of legislative . . . can be 
no other than . . . to make laws, and not to make legislators, the legisla-
tive can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws and 
place it in the other hands.30 
 
25  Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act:  Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 5 (2010) (statement of 
Richard Shelby, U.S. Senate, Member, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs). 
 28 Id. 
 29 David Indiviglio, Chamber Stands Against Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, THE 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/03/
chamber-stands-against-consumer-financial-protection-bureau/37563. 
 30 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 141, at 81 (Thomas P. Peardon 
ed., The Liberal Art Press, Inc., 1952) (1690). 
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One of the earliest articulations of this principle by the Supreme 
Court can be found in J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, where 
Chief Justice Taft upheld Congress’s delegation of power to the Pres-
ident through the Tariff Act of 1922 to adjust the duties imposed on 
imports by the Act.31  Specifically, Taft stated what has come to be 
known as the “intelligible principle” test, writing that “[i]f Congress 
shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the 
person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, 
such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative 
power.”32  Taft found that the Tariff Act of 1922 contained such an 
intelligible principle since it mandated that import tariffs should 
“equal the difference between the cost of producing [the articles] in 
a foreign country . . . and the cost of producing and selling like or 
similar articles in the United States.”33 
Despite the deep roots of this principle, however, the Supreme 
Court has applied it only two times as a basis for invalidating acts of 
Congress—in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan34 and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States.35  These two cases, both decided during a period 
of major reform of the role of government in American society, 
sparked heavy criticism by the Roosevelt Administration and academ-
ics, who accused the Court of “threatening to defeat the efforts of our 
political democracy to use government as an instrumentality for the 
effective control of our national economy.”36  It soon became clear, 
however, that the Court would abandon their fight against such Con-
gressional delegation.  Since Schechter, the Court has yet to strike 
down any other statute on the basis of the nondelegation principle, 
and its standards for what type of directives can constitute an “intel-
ligible principle” have been greatly diluted.  The Court, for example, 
has upheld the authority of the SEC to pass rules to ensure that the 
structures of holding company systems are not “unduly or unnecessa-
rily complicate[d]” and do not “unfairly or inequitably distribute vot-
ing power among security holders,”37 and it has approved standards as 
 
 31 See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 412–13 (1928) (affirming the 
constitutionality of the Tariff Act of 1922). 
 32 Id. at 409. 
 33 Id. at 404. 
 34 See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 392 (1935) (finding the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act’s delegation of legislative power as void). 
 35 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 500 (1935) (holding 
that “Congress has set up no intelligible policies to govern the President”). 
 36 James Hart, Limits of Legislative Delegation, 221 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 87, 87 
(1942). 
 37 Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946). 
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vague as “generally fair and equitable and . . . effectuat[ing] the pur-
poses of [an] Act”38 and regulating in the “public interest, conveni-
ence, or necessity.”39 
This early disablement of the doctrine, however, should not be 
confused with an end of its vitality.  In a number of relatively recent 
decisions, various members of the Court have made sure to stress the 
continued importance of the nondelegation principle and describe 
circumstances under which its revival could come about.  In Industrial 
Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, the Court 
upheld Congress’ delegation of power to the Secretary of Labor to 
promulgate occupational safety and health standards “reasonably ne-
cessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and 
places of employment.”40  The Act directed the Secretary, in promul-
gating standards, to “set the standard which most adequately assures, 
to the extent feasible . . . that no employee will suffer material im-
pairment of health . . . .”41  Justice Rehnquist, concurring in judgment 
but finding the delegation to be impermissible, stated that “the legis-
lative history contains nothing to indicate that the language ‘to the 
extent feasible’ does anything other than render what had been a 
clear . . . standard largely, if not entirely, precatory.”42  Rehnquist de-
scribed what he saw as the three main functions of the nondelegation 
doctrine:  (1) ensuring “to the extent consistent with orderly gov-
ernment administration that important choices of social policy are 
made by Congress;” (2) guaranteeing that Congress provides the re-
cipient of any delegated authority “an ‘intelligible principle’ to guide 
the exercise of the delegated discretion;” and (3) ensuring that 
“courts charged with reviewing the exercise of delegated legislative 
discretion will be able to test that exercise against ascertainable stan-
dards.”43  Here, Rehnquist found that Congress was faced with a poli-
cy choice between “balancing statistical lives and industrial resources” 
or “elevat[ing] human life above all concerns save massive dislocation 
in an affected industry” and recognizing the difficulty of the choice 
improperly deferred to the executive.44 
 
 38 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944). 
 39 Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943) (upholding the FCC’s 
power to regulate airwaves); see also New York Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 
12, 24–25 (1932) (upholding the ICC’s power to approve railroad consolidations). 
 40 448 U.S. 607, 615 (1980). 
 41 Id. at 612. 
 42 Id. at 681–82 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 43 Id. at 685–86 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 44 Id. at 685 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
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Similar guidance is found in Mistretta v. United States, which con-
cerned the authority of the newly created United States Sentencing 
Commission to promulgate federal sentencing guidelines.45  The ma-
jority upheld the authority and stated that  
[o]nly if we could say that there is an absence of standards for the guid-
ance of the Administrator’s action, so that it would be impossible in a 
proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been 
obeyed, would we be justified in overriding its choice of means for effect-
ing its declared purpose.46 
In dissent, Justice Scalia commented that “[i]t is difficult to im-
agine a principle more essential to democratic government than that 
upon which the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is founded.”47  
Scalia stressed that given that intelligible principles as vague as “pub-
lic interest” standards had survived judicial scrutiny, the critical ques-
tion was whether the delegated law-making power in question was 
“ancillary” to the inherent constitutional authority of the government 
branch entrusted with the power.48  Scalia found that “[t]he lawmak-
ing function of the Sentencing Commission [was] completely di-
vorced from any responsibility for execution of the law or adjudica-
tion of private rights under the law,” and thus was impermissible.49 
Finally, the most recent case providing guidance as to what is left 
of the nondelegation doctrine is Whitman v. American Trucking 
Ass’ns.50  In the case below, the D.C. Circuit had ruled that a provision 
of the Clear Air Act lacked sufficiently determinate criteria for guid-
ing the agency’s discretion and remanded the case to the EPA to con-
strue the Act for an intelligible principle by which to govern its deci-
sions.51  The Court was decisive in reversing the D.C. Circuit, but did 
reiterate some points made in earlier decisions regarding features of 
the doctrine.  Particularly relevant was the statement by Justice Scalia 
that although “even in sweeping regulatory schemes we have never 
demanded . . . that statutes provide ‘determinate criterion’ for saying 
 
 45 488 U.S. 361, 370 (1989) (“Mistretta moved to have the promulgated Guidelines ruled 
unconstitutional on the grounds that . . . Congress delegated excessive authority to the 
[Sentencing] Commission to structure the guidelines.”). 
 46 Id. at 379 (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425–26 (1944)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 47 Id. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 48 See id. at 417–18 (“The whole theory of lawful congressional ‘delegation’ is . . . that a cer-
tain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial ac-
tion . . . .”). 
 49 Id. at 420. 
 50 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
 51 Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev’d in part, 531 U.S. 
457 (2001) (“[W]e are remanding to EPA to formulate adequate decision criteria . . . .”). 
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‘how much [of the regulated harm] is too much,’” that “the degree of 
agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of 
the power congressionally conferred.”52 
Synthesizing the above cases yields the conclusion that today there 
are two versions of the nondelegation doctrine.53  First, there is a ver-
sion based on some of the actual language used by various Justices in 
recent nondelegation cases, including those discussed above.  Under 
this version, a determination of the validity of Congressional delega-
tion of power to an agency seems to require a multi-step inquiry into 
the magnitude of the agency’s powers, the scope of its jurisdiction, 
and the relation of its rule-making authority to its enforcement and 
adjudicatory powers.  This version seems to revolve more directly 
around the spirit of that original statement of the doctrine by John 
Locke, and ultimately seeks to determine the range of discretion 
available to an agency implementing Congressional decisions regard-
ing issues of national policy.  Only if the delegation is so great such 
that it would be the agency rather than the legislature doing the poli-
cy-setting would this version of the doctrine find a constitutional 
problem. 
Then there is the second version of the doctrine, this one based 
more directly on a survey of case outcomes.  Under this version, iden-
tifying how much discretion is too much is deemed to be an impossi-
ble task, and so the Court is unlikely to strike a statute down as un-
constitutional if it can identify even some vague standard to call an 
“intelligible principle.”54  It is this second version of the doctrine that 
 
 52 Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475 (alteration in original).  As an illustrative example, Scalia wrote 
that “[w]hile Congress need not provide any direction to the EPA regarding the manner 
in which it is to define ‘country elevators,’ which are to be exempt from new-stationary-
source regulations governing grain elevators, it must provide substantial guidance on set-
ting air standards that affect the entire national economy.”  Id. 
 53 For alternative views of what the nondelegation is or should be see MARTIN H. REDISH, 
THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 136 (1995) (analyzing the important role 
the Constitution plays in dictating the structure of our government, and suggesting that 
courts should “demand as the prerequisite for legislative action some meaningful level of 
normative political commitment by the enacting legislators, thus enabling the electorate 
to judge its representatives”); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231, 1239 (1994) (arguing that the post-New Deal administrative 
state is unconstitutional and that “the core of the Constitution’s nondelegation principle 
can be expressed as follows:  Congress must make whatever policy decisions are sufficient-
ly important to the statutory scheme at issue so that Congress must make them”). 
 54 In attempting to answer why the nondelegation doctrine has had “so little a constraining 
effect” if it is “so fundamental a principle to our constitutional order,” some have argued 
that judges’ “rhetorical enthusiasm for the nondelegation doctrine was overmatched by 
their reluctance to confront the legislature.”  Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, 
Nondelegation and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 251, 259–60 (2010). 
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is more useful in determining how the Court would rule on the con-
stitutionality of the Bureau’s power. 
B. Overview of the Bureau and its Powers 
With the key factors of the nondelegation doctrine in mind, in 
this section I provide an overview of the Bureau and the Act, focusing 
on features relevant to the nondelegation inquiry, including:  identi-
fying the scope of its jurisdiction and magnitude of its powers; dis-
cussing the relation of its rulemaking authority to its enforcement 
powers; and describing the range of discretion available to it in 
promulgating rules. 
The Bureau has authority to regulate any person who engages in 
offering or providing a “consumer financial product or service,” and 
any affiliate service provider of such a person.55  Consumer financial 
products and services are defined to include, among other things, fi-
nancial products or services provided for use by consumers primarily 
for personal, family, or household purposes, and certain financial 
products or services offered in connection with a consumer financial 
product.56 
The Act provides a laundry list of such products and services, in-
cluding:  (1) extending credit and servicing loans; (2) extending or 
brokering certain leases of personal or real property; (3) providing 
real estate settlement services; (4) engaging in deposit-taking activi-
ties; (5) selling payment instruments; (6) providing check cashing or 
collection services; and (7) providing certain financial advisory ser-
vices.57  If the Bureau does not find this list sufficiently comprehen-
sive, it also has the authority to add additional products or services 
through regulation.58  In lay terms, this means that the Bureau has 
rule-making authority over a vast swath of the U.S. financial services 
industry, and will be able to regulate financial products ranging from 
credit cards to mortgages.  The scope of its jurisdiction might, in fact, 
be better understood by the short list of institutions exempt from its 
authority, including:  certain retailers offering credit in connection 
with the sale of nonfinancial goods or services, real estate brokerage 
services, lawyers, insurance companies, and auto dealers.59 
 
 55 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 1002(6), 124 Stat. 1376, 1955 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481). 
 56 Id. at § 1002(5)(A), (B), 124 Stat. at 1956 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481). 
 57 Id. at § 1002(15)(A), 124 Stat at 1957–58 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481). 
 58 Id. at § 1002(15)(A)(xi), 124 Stat, at 1959 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481). 
 59 Id. at §§ 1027, 1029, 124 Stat. at 1995–2006 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5517, 5519). 
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In describing the relation of its rulemaking authority to its en-
forcement power, the Act divides its jurisdiction into three categories:  
(1) “very large” depository institutions, (2) “other” depository institu-
tions, and (3) nondepository institutions.  The “very large” depository 
institution category includes insured banks, savings associations, and 
credit unions with total assets of more than $10 billion.60  In regards 
to these institutions, the Bureau has exclusive authority to require re-
ports and conduct examinations in connection with the enforcement 
of consumer financial protection laws, and the primary authority to 
enforce such laws.61  The “other” depository institutions category in-
cludes insured banks, savings associations, and credit unions with to-
tal assets of less than $10 billion.62  What is critically different for this 
category of institutions, however, is that it is the individual institu-
tions’ prudential banking regulators rather than the Bureau that are 
authorized to enforce the consumer protection laws against them.63  
Thus, while the Bureau may promulgate rules affecting such institu-
tions, it does not actually have authority to enforce the rules against 
the institutions.  Finally, the nondepository institutions category in-
cludes a range of other institutions providing consumer financial 
products or services.  The Bureau must consult with the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) prior to issuing rules to define persons 
covered under this category, and retains, in large part, exclusive 
rulemaking and enforcement authority against the institutions.64 
The Act contains two sections that provide insight as to the degree 
of discretion available to the Bureau when promulgating rules.  
Broadly speaking, there are two sets of laws that provide the Bureau 
with the authority to promulgate rules:  (1) consumer protection laws 
in existence prior to the to the Act, the enforcement of which will be 
transferred to the Bureau from other agencies; and (2) consumer 
protection laws put in place by the Act, the enforcement of which are 
assigned directly to the Bureau.  Subtitle B, titled “General Powers of 
the Bureau” deals broadly with both sets of these laws and authorizes 
the Bureau to “administer and carry out the purposes and objectives 
of the Federal consumer financial laws, and to prevent evasions the-
reof.”65  Thus, in addition to any guiding statements contained in the 
Act itself, the Bureau must also take into account the purposes of the 
 
 60 Id. at § 1025(a), 124 Stat. at 1990 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5515). 
 61 Id. at § 1025(b)(1), (c), 124 Stat. at 1990–91 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5515). 
 62 Id. at § 1026(a), 124 Stat. at 1993 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5516). 
 63 Id. at § 1026(d), 124 Stat. at 1994 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5516). 
 64 Id. at § 1024(c)(3), 124 Stat. 1987 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5514). 
 65 Id. at § 1022(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1980 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512). 
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various consumer protection laws that proposed rules seek to aid the 
enforcement of. 
Although it is plausible that this standard in and of itself could be 
sufficient to satisfy the loose “intelligible principle” test, the section 
elaborates much further.  Section 1021(b) lists five objectives of the 
Bureau, including ensuring (1) consumers are provided with timely 
and understandable information to make responsible decisions about 
financial transactions; (2) consumers are protected from unfair de-
ceptive, or abusive acts and practices and from discrimination; (3) 
outdated, unnecessary or unduly burdensome regulations are regu-
larly identified and addressed in order to reduce unwarranted regula-
tory burdens; (4) Federal consumer financial law is enforced consis-
tently without regard to the status of a person as a depository 
institution, in order to promote fair competition; and (5) markets for 
consumer financial products and services operate transparently and 
efficiently to facilitate access and innovation.66 
In addition to these five objectives, 1022(b)(2) also proscribes 
“standards for rulemaking,” including, among other things that:  (1) 
the Bureau shall consider the potential benefits and costs to consum-
ers and covered persons, including the potential reduction of access 
to consumer financial products or services resulting from such rule; 
and (2) the Bureau shall consult with other appropriate agencies re-
garding consistency with prudential, market, or systemic objectives 
administered by such agencies.67  The Bureau is also allowed to pass 
rules to exempt any class of covered persons, service providers, or 
consumer financial products from any provision as it determines “ne-
cessary or appropriate to carry out . . . [its] purposes or objectives,” 
taking into consideration:  (1) the total assets of the class of covered 
persons; (2) the volume of transactions involving consumer financial 
products or services in which the class of covered person engages; 
and (3) existing provisions of law applicable to the consumer finan-
cial product or services and the extent to which such provisions pro-
vide consumers with adequate protections.68 
Subsection C of the Act, titled “Specific Powers of the Bureau,” 
deals more narrowly with laws created by the Act and assigned direct-
ly to the Bureau for enforcement, including for example, Section 
1036, which makes it unlawful for any covered person to, among oth-
er things, “engage in any unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or prac-
 
 66 Id. at § 1021(b)(1)–(5), 124 Stat. at 1979 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5511). 
 67 Id. at § 1022(b)(2)(A), (B), 124 Stat. at 1980 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512). 
 68 Id. at § 1022(b)(3)(A), (B), 124 Stat. at 1980 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512). 
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tice.”69  Section 1031(a) authorizes the Bureau to enforce this law, 
and Section 1031(b) authorizes it to prescribe rules to identify acts or 
practices as unfair, deceptive or abusive.70 
The Bureau can declare an act or practice “unfair” only if it has a 
“reasonable basis” to conclude that it is “likely to cause substantial in-
jury to consumers which is not reasonably avoided by consumers” and 
“such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits 
to consumers or to competition.”71  The Bureau is also allowed to 
consider “established public policies” as evidence of unfairness, 
though not as a primary basis for promulgating a rule.72 
The Bureau can declare an act or practice “abusive” only if it “ma-
terially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term 
or condition of a consumer financial product” or takes unreasonable 
advantage of (1) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer 
of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or services; 
(2) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the con-
sumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product or service; 
or (3) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person 
to act in the interests of the consumer.73  With the above powers of 
the Bureau in mind, the following section will analyze how they stand 
up to the requirements of the nondelegation doctrine. 
C. Application of the Doctrine to the Bureau 
Returning to the two versions of the nondelegation doctrine 
summarized previously, it seems clear that the guidance provided by 
the Act is sufficiently determinate to satisfy the requirement of the 
second version of the doctrine, the “intelligible principle” test.  The 
guidance is at least as specific as that in other statutes upheld by the 
Court in previous cases, and any court reviewing the authority of the 
Bureau to promulgate a particular rule will be able to cross-reference 
the Bureau’s justification of it with the five objectives of the Bureau 
made explicit by the Act, the various standards of rulemaking con-
tained in it, and the legislative purpose of the particular consumer 
protection law the rule is designed to help enforce. 
What is more debatable, however, is the adherence of the Bureau 
with the first described version of the doctrine and the spirit of the 
 
 69 Id. at § 1036(a)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 2010 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5536). 
 70 Id. at § 1031(a), (b), 124 Stat. at 2005 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531). 
 71 Id. at § 1031(c)(1)(A), (B), 124 Stat. at 2005 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531). 
 72 Id. at § 1031(c)(2), 124 Stat. at 2005 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531). 
 73 Id. at § 1031(d)(1), (2), 124 Stat. at 2005 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531). 
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original nondelegation principle.  Take for example, the above-
discussed “standard for rulemaking” requiring the Bureau to “consider 
the potential benefits and costs to consumers and covered persons, 
including the potential reduction of access . . . to consumer financial 
products or services.”74  This statement seems to be a clear example of 
Congressional avoidance of a difficult policy choice, much like that 
identified by Justice Rehnquist in American Petroleum Institute.  If Con-
gress intended that the Bureau balance costs and benefits, it would 
have used language more like that used in §1031(c)(1)(A), which in 
defining “fairness” calls for a determination of whether “substantial 
injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers.”75  
While the exercise of cost-benefit analysis itself has been the subject 
of much criticism,76 Congress stops short of even going this far, refus-
ing to decide whether consumer protection is even theoretically an 
important enough goal to justify disproportionate costs to lenders.  
This raises the question as to under which circumstances a reviewing 
court will consider the Bureau to have adequately “considered” costs 
and benefits.  Can a rule be promulgated if the Bureau concedes that 
costs exceed benefits?  In my view, a “consideration” of costs and 
benefits means that the Bureau may pass a rule so long as costs do 
not grossly outweigh benefits; this certainly does not seem to be the 
type of guidance that would even remotely be of comfort to John 
Locke. 
Another example of the Administration skirting the boundaries of 
the doctrine is the Act’s special treatment of “other” depository insti-
tutions.  As stated earlier, although the Bureau has the authority to 
promulgate rules that are applicable to these institutions, it does not 
have any authority to enforce such rules against them.  It would be 
 
 74 Id. at § 1022(b)(2)(A), (B), 124 Stat. at 1980 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 5512) (emphasis 
added). 
 75 Id. at § 1031(c)(1)(A), (B), 124 Stat. at 2005 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531) (empha-
sis added). 
 76 One of the basic criticisms of cost-benefit analysis is the difficulty of incommensurability, 
occurring when “relevant goods cannot be aligned along a single metric without doing 
violence to our considered judgments about how these goods are best characterized.”  
Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 796 
(1994).  For example, it is not entirely straightforward as to how to compare reduction in 
access to credit for consumers to fungible costs borne on a bank to comply with a Bureau 
rule.  Critics also point to the fact that in quantifying the value of non-market goods, it is 
difficult to obtain “objective data on individual preferences.”  Don B. Hardin, Jr., Why 
Cost-Benefit Analysis?  A Question (And Some Answers) About The Legal Academy, 59 ALA. L. 
REV. 1135, 1165 (2008).  For example, some have contended that “the costs of a policy 
change are often far easier to quantify than its benefits,” and that as a result, policy deci-
sions in such areas tend to “result[] in a bias in favor of the status quo.”  Robert H. Frank, 
Why is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 913, 928 (2000). 
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one thing if these institutions comprised a small portion of the Bu-
reau’s overall jurisdiction, but the fact that they comprise such a large 
percentage of it renders it quite another.  Banks with assets less than 
$10 billion, the amount large enough to put them in the “very large” 
category over which the Bureau has enforcement authority, comprise 
98.7% of the roster of FDIC-insured institutions.77  Certainly, this is 
not quite what Scalia alluded to in Mistretta when he said that the 
lawmaking function of the Sentencing Commission was “completely 
divorced”78 from its responsibility for execution of the law, but it is 
certainly reminiscent of it.  If rulemaking authority is meant to be an-
cillary to and in aid of enforcement authority, why is it that the Bu-
reau’s rules affect so many more institutions than the Bureau has 
power to enforce them against?  Why not allow the Bureau to prom-
ulgate rules that account for whatever special situation small deposi-
tory institutions present?  The answer to this question is simple:  
community banks were in a much better position to influence politi-
cians than the megabanks which, accurately or not, were considered 
more responsible for causing the crisis.  Regardless of the reasoning 
for the provision, however, its implications are certainly worthy of 
criticism. 
Perhaps even more troubling than these nondelegation concerns 
are related worries about the insulation of the Bureau from oversight.  
Most notable among these is the mechanism by which the Bureau is 
funded.  Although most agencies rely on Congressional appropria-
tions for fulfilling their budget, the Bureau is instead funded directly 
by the Federal Reserve, with a specific provision dictating that its 
funds “shall not be subject to review by the Committees on Appropri-
ations of the House of Representatives and the Senate.”79  In the age 
of the filibuster, where achieving the sixty vote supermajority that is 
often required to pass a resolution overruling or preempting an 
agency rule is very difficult, appropriations threats are a common way 
of facilitating Congressional oversight of agencies.  On the other 
hand, Bureau proponents are correct in pointing out that the Bureau 
has less budgetary independence than any other federal bank regula-
 
 77 Banking Giants Control 90% of Industry Assets, PROBLEM BANK LIST (Sept. 6, 2010), 
http://problembanklist.com/banking-giants-control-of-industry-assets-0189/. The coun-
terpoint to this is that such “very large” institutions with assets over $10 billion control 
78% of industry assets.  Id. 
 78  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 420 (1989).   
 79 Dodd-Frank Act § 1017(a)(2)(C), 124 Stat. 1376, 1975 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5497). 
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tor.80  In particular, the OCC, FDIC, and OTS can increase their 
budgets by simply increasing their assessments on banks, and the 
Federal Reserve can do so by simply printing money.81  It is not clear, 
however, whether this comparison is fair.  In particular, the Bureau is 
in many ways more similar to an appropriations-funded agency such 
as the SEC than the banking regulators, whose primary task is to en-
sure the safety and soundness of the financial system. 
A similar concern is the inconspicuous exemption of the Bureau 
from the Paperwork Reduction Act (“PRA”).82  The PRA dictates that 
all agencies obtain approval from the Office of Information and Reg-
ulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) before distributing forms that impose an in-
formation collection burden on the general public.83  As such, it 
serves as a mechanism for the executive branch to oversee even inde-
pendent agencies.  The PRA does contain an exemption, however, 
whereby an independent agency “administered by 2 or more mem-
bers” may void any relevant disapproval of its authority.84  Since the 
Bureau is administered by a single Director and not “2 or more 
members,” it would appear that this exemption would not be appli-
cable to it.  The Act, however, amends the PRA and carves out a spe-
cific exemption for the Bureau, stating that rules or orders prescribed 
or proposed by the Director shall be treated “on the same terms and 
conditions as apply to . . . [those] proposed by the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System.”85  The Board of Governors, how-
ever, is a multimember body, and as such, it does have the power to 
void OIRA disapproval.  Treating the Bureau the same way would 
imply that the Bureau’s single Director would also have this power.86 
The fact that the Bureau is administered by a single Director as 
opposed to a multimember commission is itself an issue of concern.  
Although other agencies with similarly broad powers, such as the 
SEC, are administered by multimember commissions that have limits 
 
 80 Legislative Proposals to Improve the Structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:  Hear-
ing Before the S. Comm. On Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, 112th Cong. (2011) 
(statement of Adam J. Levitin, Assoc. Professor of Law, Georgetown University), available 
at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/040611levitin.pdf. 
 81 Id. 
 82 44 U.S.C. § 3501-49 (2006). 
 83       44 U.S.C. § 3507(a)(2) (2006) (providing that an agency shall not conduct or sponsor the 
collection of information unless “the [OIRA] Director has approved the proposed collec-
tion of information or approval has been inferred, under the provisions of this section”).  
 84 Id. § 3507(f)(1). 
 85 Dodd-Frank Act § 1100D(c), 124 Stat. 2111 (to be codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3502). 
 86 CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM 
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT:  REGULATIONS TO BE ISSUED BY THE CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 26 (2010). 
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on the maximum number of appointees from a single political par-
ty,87 there is no similar mechanism to ensure that opposing ideologi-
cal views are represented at the highest level of Bureau decision-
making.  The Chamber of Commerce has offered four reasons for its 
support of H.R. 1121, which would replace the director with a five-
member commission:  (1) “[c]onform[ing] the Bureau to other in-
dependent agencies”; (2) “ensur[ing] better, impartial decision-
making”; (3) “minimiz[ing] risk of regulatory capture”; and (4) “en-
sur[ing] continuity and stability.”88  It seems doubtful that the suppo-
sedly more streamlined and efficient decision-making made possible 
by having a single Director89 is a sufficient justification for these con-
cerns. 
In sum, while it appears that the Bureau is indeed within the 
bounds of that version of the nondelegation doctrine applied in prac-
tice by the Court, there are numerous provisions of the Act that seem 
to conflict squarely with the spirit of the nondelegation principle.  
One justification for this could perhaps be the fact that the delega-
tion of such discretion is the small price that must be paid to avoid 
the even greater administrative overreach that occurred during the 
financial crisis.  In particular, it is arguable that the expansive use by 
the Federal Reserve of its discount window90 and the enactment of 
 
 87 No more than three of the five members of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
may be from the same political party.  15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006). 
 88 Legislative Proposals to Improve the Structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:  Hear-
ing Before the S. Comm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, 112th Cong. (2011) 
(statement of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce), available at http://financialservices.
house.gov/media/pdf/040611sharp.pdf. 
 89 See Legislative Proposals to Improve the Structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, 112th Cong. 
(2011) (statement of Adam J. Levitin, Assoc. Professor of Law, Georgetown University), 
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/040611levitin.pdf (“This mod-
el enhances accountability and enables streamlined, decisive leadership and decision-
making.”). 
 90 Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act provides that “[i]n unusual and exigent circums-
tances,” the Board of Governors can authorize any Federal Reserve bank to discount for 
any corporation “notes, drafts, and bills of exchange [when] . . . indorsed or otherwise 
secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank” so long as “before discount-
ing . . . the Federal reserve bank . . . obtain[s] evidence that such . . . corporation is una-
ble to secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions.”  12 
U.S.C. § 343 (2006).  Although it had not been used as such since the Great Depression, 
during and after the crisis, the Fed seized upon this broad language that seemingly allows 
it to lend to anybody without any realistic fear of judicial review.  Steven M. Davidoff & 
David Zaring, Regulation by Deal:  The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 463, 477–78 (2009) (“This particular government action also set a precedent:  it 
was done . . . via the legal authority that would be used for each of the government’s ad 
hoc bailouts . . . .  For the legal authority to make this loan, the Federal Reserve relied 
upon the broad language of its discount window authority . . . a law that was last invoked 
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TARP91 represent far greater abdications of legislative responsibility 
than Dodd-Frank.  If the Bureau is indeed able to accomplish the 
goals that led to its creation and prevent the future need to resort to 
such dramatic programs, perhaps it should be seen as a positive even 
to advocates of a revived nondelegation doctrine. 
At the same time, however, if principles as supposedly fundamen-
tal as the nondelegation doctrine can be abandoned in times of crisis, 
are they really fundamental at all?  If the government itself can not be 
expected to adhere to the “spirit of the law,” it seems unfair for it to 
blame private enterprises for seeking regulatory loopholes as well.  It 
appears that in drafting the Act, Congress clearly did have an under-
standing of what type of statutes would and would not be struck down 
by the Court as unconstitutional delegations of power; unfortunately, 
it seems that they did not have an understanding of the real idea be-







to the benefit of nonbanks in the Great Depression. . . . in administering the discount 
window and providing assistance to banks, the Federal Reserve’s actions are effectively 
removed from judicial review.”).  All in all, the Fed used its discretion to make loans in an 
amount of $3.3 trillion during the period from December 2007 to July 2010, and needless 
to say, Congress played little role in guiding its discretion.  Leo & Randall, supra note 16 
(“The U.S. central bank on Wednesday disclosed details of some $3.3 trillion in loans 
made to financial firms, companies and foreign central banks during the crisis.”). 
 91 TARP authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, with a budget of $750 billion, to “pur-
chase . . . troubled assets from any financial institution, on such terms and conditions as 
are determined by the Secretary.”  Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. 
L. No. 110-343, § 101(a)(1), 122 Stat. 3765, 3767 (2008) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 
5211).  The act provided little guidance to the Secretary, dictating, for example, that the 
purchases be limited to those which he “determines promotes financial stability,” that the 
Secretary “prevent unjust enrichment of financial institutions” and that he “take into con-
sideration” nine equally indeterminate factors.  Id. at §§ 3(9), 101(e), 103, 122 Stat. at 
3767–68, 3770, (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).  Numerous scholars 
have questioned the constitutionality of these actions.  See e.g., Davidoff & Zaring, supra 
note 90, at 516 (“The constitutional question most troublingly presented by the Paulson 
draft [proposal for the TARP]—albeit less obviously by the congressional statutes that 
elaborated Treasury’s responsibilities and that followed it—was whether the bill delegated 
an unconstitutionally undefined amount of power to Treasury.”); Gary Lawson, Burying 
the Constitution Under a TARP, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55, 61 (2010) (“Even assuming 
that Congress somehow has the power to turn the Treasury Department into a subsidiary 
of Countrywide, the statutory authorization to the Treasury in TARP violates the constitu-
tional nondelegation principle.”). 
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IV.  ELIZABETH WARREN & THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE 
Another example of the Administration’s failure to adhere to the 
spirit of long-established constitutional doctrines is the appointment 
without Senate approval of Elizabeth Warren as “Assistant to the Pres-
ident and Special Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury on the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.”  While Warren has since re-
signed from this post and President Obama has nominated former 
Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray to be the Bureau’s first Di-
rector, the issues raised by the initial appointment of Warren remain 
significant.92  Exemplary of critics who have chastised the Administra-
tion for the exploitation of a constitutional loophole is Professor 
Bruce Ackerman, who called the appointment “another milestone 
down the path toward an imperial presidency” and has said that 
“[d]uring America’s first 150 years, Ms. Warren’s appointment as a 
special advisor to the White House would have been unthinkable.”93  
Much as Congress crafted Dodd-Frank to ensure that the Bureau 
would not violate the black-letter rules of the non-delegation doc-
trine, President Obama has made sure not to violate any provision of 
the Court’s Appointments Clause doctrine in his appointment of 
Warren.  As I will argue in this section, however, the appointment did 
represent a significant deviation from the spirit of the Appointments 
Clause, and is as great a cause of concern as the above-described non-
delegation issues. 
Before analyzing the appointment, I will begin this section in Part 
A by summarizing the Court’s relevant Appointments Clause doc-
trines.  In Part B, I will apply these doctrines to the appointment of 
Warren.  Specifically, I will argue in Part B that the undefined scope 
of the powers granted to Warren during her tenure with the Bureau 
is itself indicative of the Administration’s willingness to stray from the 
spirit of the law.  I will also argue in favor of an interpretation of the 
Act that would have restricted Warren’s powers, and brought the ap-
pointment back within the confines of the law’s intent. 
 
 92 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., Treasury Department Announces Plans for Lea-
dership Transition at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (July 26, 2011), available 
at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1258.aspx. 
 93 Bruce Ackerman, Obama, Warren and The Imperial Presidency, WALL STREET J., Sept. 22, 
2010 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703989304575503661726493580.
html. 
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A. Summary of the Appointments Clause Doctrine 
Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution, commonly re-
ferred to as the Appointments Clause, reads in relevant part that: 
[The President] shall nominate, and, by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the Unit-
ed States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, 
and which shall be established by Law:  but the Congress may by Law vest 
the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the 
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.94 
In accordance with this provision, the first step in assessing the con-
stitutionality of the mechanism used to appoint an agency official is 
determining whether the official is an “Officer of the United States.”  
The Court in Buckley v. Valeo held that a person is such an officer if 
they exercise “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United 
States.”95  The Court made clear, however, that the term does not ap-
ply to employees of the United States who are “lesser functionaries 
subordinate to officers of the United States.”96 
If it is determined that an official is an Officer of the United 
States, the next step is determining whether he is a “principal” officer 
or an “inferior” officer.  If he is the former, Senate confirmation of 
his appointment is required, and if he is the latter, Congress may vest 
appointment power in the President.97  In Morrisson v. Olson the Court 
acknowledged that the Founders provided little guidance as to where 
to draw the line between these two categories.  Rather than adopting 
a bright line rule, the Court set out four criteria to provide guidance 
to courts making such a determination, including:  (1) whether the 
officer is subject to removal by a higher official other than the Presi-
dent; (2) whether the scope of the office is limited in duties; (3) 
whether the scope of the office is limited in jurisdiction; and (4) 
whether the length of the officer’s tenure is limited in time.98  In Ed-
mond v. United States the Court emphasized that it is the first of these 
four factors that is the most important.99 
 
 94 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 95 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam). 
 96 Id. at 126 n.162. 
 97 See id. at 132 (“Principal officers are selected by the President with the advice and consent 
of the Senate.  Inferior officers Congress may allow to be appointed by the President 
alone . . . .”). 
 98 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988) (discussing the factors which deter-
mined whether the appellant is an inferior officer). 
 99 See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662 (1997) (“Generally speaking, the term 
‘inferior officer’ connotes a relationship with some higher ranking officer or officers be-
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B. Application of the Doctrine to the Warren Appointment 
Turning now to the application of this doctrine to the Bureau, it 
seems clear that since the Director has vast investigative, prosecutori-
al, and adjudicative powers, and is removable by the President only 
for cause, that he qualifies as a principle “Officer of the United 
States.”  What is more questionable, however, is whether Warren was 
also such an officer.  In this section I separate the analysis of this 
question into two parts.  In the first, I will attempt to identify the 
scope of the powers that were granted to Warren, and suggest that 
there are two general possibilities for what they included.  I will con-
clude that the undefined nature of these powers is itself indicative of 
the Administration’s willingness to stray from the spirit of the law.  In 
the second part, I will analogize the appointment to the issuance of 
an executive order and argue in favor of an interpretation of the Act 
that would have restricted Warren’s powers, and brought the ap-
pointment back within the confines of the law’s intent. 
1. Identifying the Scope of Warren’s Powers 
Before deciding whether the appointment of Warren should have 
been subject to Senate confirmation, we must determine the scope of 
Warren’s powers.  While one can look back on Warren’s tenure and 
examine what powers she actually exercised, the relevant question for 
our analysis is determining what powers she was legally authorized to ex-
ercise.  Unfortunately, however, the Administration has provided little 
guidance for this inquiry.  The White House press release announc-
ing the appointment said only that “Professor Warren has been a 
pioneer on the issues before the Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau, and she will now help lead the effort to stand up the agency.”100  
The Bureau website, while providing a bullet point list of jobs that the 
“Implementation Team” is “hard at work on,” also failed to define the 
outer limits of Warren’s powers.101  This being the case, we must turn 
 
low the President:  Whether one is an ‘inferior’ officer depends on whether he has a su-
perior.”). 
100 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Names Eliza-
beth Warren Assistant to the President and Special Advisor to the Secretary of the Trea-
sury on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Sep. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/17/president-obama-names-
elizabeth-warren-assistant-president-and-special-a. 
101 Specifically, the Bureau website provides that the Bureau is “hard at work”:  (1) 
“[m]eeting with consumer groups and financial services companies to ensure the con-
sumer bureau’s work targets real problems people encounter in the marketplace;” (2) 
“[s]etting up and training the teams that will be responsible for supervising and enforc-
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to the text of the Act to speculate on what these powers may have in-
cluded. 
Some have suggested that Warren’s position was akin to that of an 
“interim Director,” a position explicitly created in the Act and filled 
by the Secretary of the Treasury.  Section 1066 of the Act authorizes 
the Secretary of the Treasury “to perform the functions of the Bureau 
under . . . subtitle [F] until the Director of the Bureau is confirmed 
by the Senate.”102  If Warren was indeed intended to have been some 
sort of interim Director, her powers would presumably have been the 
same as those temporarily granted by the Act to the Secretary.  Unfor-
tunately, however, this only leads to another question:  What are the 
powers of the Secretary?  There seem to be two different answers to 
this question depending on how the Subtitle is interpreted. 
Subtitle F is, in summary, the section of the Act that describes the 
“transitional provisions” for the Bureau.  The subtitle provides a defi-
nition of “consumer financial protection functions,” including au-
thority to promulgate rules,103 and dictates that these should be trans-
ferred from various other agencies to the Bureau by a designated 
transfer date.104  Not later than this date, which occurred on July 21, 
2011, the Bureau “shall, after consultation with the head of each 
transferor agency, identify the rules and orders that will be enforced 
by the Bureau.”105  The Subtitle also directs the Bureau and the heads 
of various other agencies to identify employees who are to be trans-
ferred to the Bureau.106  Under one interpretation of the Subtitle, the 
power of the Secretary of the Treasury is limited to these transitional 
functions.  While the Secretary could lay the groundwork for future 
rulemaking proceedings, the agency would be unable to promulgate 
any legally enforceable new rules.  Although some might argue that 
 
ing Federal consumer financial laws;” (3) “[l]aying the groundwork to enforce Federal 
consumer financial laws and to write new rules required by the Dodd-Frank Act;” (4) 
“[d]eveloping a website for complaints and toll-free hotline for consumers;” and (5) 
“[p]reparing to open offices to assist specific groups of consumers, including offices for 
Servicemember Affairs and Financial Protection for Older Americans, as specifically re-
quired under the Dodd-Frank Act.” Consumer Finance Protection Bureau, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau (last visited July 11, 2011).  For an addi-
tional source containing this list, see Consumer Financial Protection BUREAU, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/about/budget-
performance/Documents/CJ_FY2012_CFPB_508.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).   
102 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1066, 124 Stat. at 2055 
(to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5586). 
103 Id. at § 1061(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 2035 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5581). 
104 Id. at § 1062, 124 Stat. at 2039 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5582). 
105 Id. at § 1063(i)(1), 124 Stat. at 2043 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5583). 
106 Id. at § 1064, 124 Stat. at 2043 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 55841). 
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granting even this authority to Warren would have been unconstitu-
tional, it seems at least relatively unproblematic if the Secretary had 
final say. 
It is under the second interpretation of the Subtitle that things 
look particularly troubling.  Specifically, under this interpretation, 
the Secretary would not only have the authority to identify rules and 
orders to be enforced by the Bureau, but also the authority to begin 
executing the “consumer financial protection functions” transferred 
to the Bureau—most significantly, initiating new rulemaking pro-
ceedings.107  Support for this interpretation can be found in National 
Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, where the D.C. Circuit held that when 
an agency’s organic statute contains a grant of rulemaking authority, 
the agency’s expansive interpretation of the ambiguous scope of the 
authority should receive deference if the disputed rulemaking func-
tion would be effective at furthering the purposes of the statue.108  
Specifically, the court upheld the Federal Trade Commission’s au-
thority to promulgate substantive legislative rules to enforce its 
mandate to prevent “unfair methods of competition in commerce, 
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce,” despite the 
fact that the agency itself did not assert the power to promulgate such 
rules until forty-eight years after its founding, and had “indicated in-
termittently before that time that it lacked such power.”109 
Analogous to the Federal Trade Commission Act, Dodd-Frank 
confers a broad grant of rule-making to the Bureau, and Subtitle F 
contains no specific limitation on this rulemaking authority prior to 
the confirmation by the Senate of a permanent Director.  As such, it 
is entirely plausible that a court could interpret the statute to allow 
the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate rules.  Even if Warren 
would have had to defer final authority to the Secretary, it is possible 
 
107 This second interpretation includes the possibility of the Secretary only having power to 
promulgate rules enforcing those laws the enforcement of which were transferred to the 
Bureau from other agencies (as opposed to laws created by the Act and specifically allo-
cated to the Bureau).  It also includes the possibility of the Secretary only being autho-
rized to promulgate rules enforceable against financial institutions (as opposed to rules 
also enforceable against those nonfinancial institutions coming within the Bureau’s juris-
diction). 
108 482 F.2d 672, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“Ambiguous legislative history cannot change the ex-
press legislative intent.  The Commission is using rule-making to carry out what the Con-
gress agreed was among its central purposes:  expedited administrative enforcement of 
the national policy against monopolies and unfair business practices.  Under the circums-
tances, since Section 6(g) plainly authorizes rule-making and nothing in the statute or in 
its legislative history precludes its use for this purpose, the action of the Commission must 
be upheld.”). 
109 Id. 
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that she would have had substantial influence on the content of any 
promulgated rules. 
Unfortunately, the administration failed to provide any clear de-
scription of how it would interpret the Act.  When asked by Senator 
Robert Corker if he believed the Bureau had rulemaking authority 
before the confirmation of a Director, Deputy Secretary of the Trea-
sury, Neal Wolin, responded only vaguely, saying “I think there is li-
mited rule-writing authority, but it is constrained until such time as 
there is a confirmed Director.”110  When asked to elaborate whether 
there is rulemaking authority before the designated transfer date, 
Wolin again provided only a squeamish answer, saying “I think the 
rulemaking authority is circumscribed.”111 
As indicated by National Petroleum Refiners, even if Wolin at one 
time asserted that that there is only limited rulemaking authority, this 
does not weigh negatively on allowing him to change his mind.  Re-
gardless of whether the Bureau eventually decides that it will or will 
not promulgate rules before the confirmation of a permanent Direc-
tor, it is the lack of clarity by the Administration on the role of War-
ren and the powers of the Bureau that suggests that they are willing 
to divert from the spirit of the law if necessary. 
2. Executive Orders:  An Analogy in Support of the Restriction of 
Warren’s Powers 
No matter how detailed or intricate a legal doctrine is, it is nearly 
impossible for a court to articulate one that, if followed, would simul-
taneously prevent all possible exploitations of the law.  Even without 
the formal appointment of Warren, there is nothing that could have 
stopped the President from unofficially soliciting her advice and forc-
ing it upon his Treasury Secretary.112  After all, if the Secretary refused 
to obey such an order the President could threaten him with removal 
from his post.  Nevertheless, it seems that there should be some legal 
mechanism to prevent the more formal appointment of an advisor 
who is charged with duties identical to those Congress has meant to 
 
110 Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act:  Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 25 (2010) (statement of 
Neal S. Wolin, U.S., Member, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs). 
111 Id. at 30. 
112 See e.g., Cary Coglianese, Presidential Control of Administrative Agencies:  A Debate Over Law or 
Politics?, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 645–46 (2010) (arguing that “any theoretical differ-
ence between influence and control, or between oversight and decision, will not be ob-
served in practice . . . . [T]he two extremes themselves are, practically speaking, indistin-
guishable.  One person’s ‘oversight’ will be another person’s ‘decision’”). 
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delegate to a Senate-confirmed appointee.  One theoretical way in 
which a limitation on the authority of such an advisor can be envi-
sioned is by analogizing the advisor’s appointment and influence to 
that of an executive order.  If the President would be unable to con-
trol the Bureau centrally through the use of executive orders forcing 
the Secretary of the Treasury to follow his instructions, he also should 
not be able to usurp the Bureau through the use of an official advisor 
like Ms. Warren. 
For the present purposes, let us adopt the views of the Court’s 
newest member, Elena Kagan, regarding the authority of the Presi-
dent to issue binding executive orders.  Under the view of Justice Ka-
gan, the fact that the Court has allowed for Congress to place restric-
tions on the President’s ability to remove an agency head implies that 
“it can advance the same end by barring the President from imposing 
his policy choices on them.”113  According to Kagan, the President 
generally has authority to issue a binding executive order on an 
agency head if Congress has allowed the President to remove the offi-
cial without cause, and generally does not if Congress has prohibited 
such removal.114  Although it is possible for Congress to mix-and-
match executive order authority with varied removal restrictions to 
the extent that the combination does not impede the President’s duty 
to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”115 since Congress 
does not tend to be explicit on such matters, courts should adopt the 
above rule of statutory interpretation.116 
There is a peculiar problem, however, with applying this rule to 
Dodd-Frank; although the permanent Director of the Bureau is re-
movable only for cause, there is no such restriction on the removal of 
the interim Director, who is a cabinet official removable at the Presi-
dent’s whim.  The rule’s application would imply that the President 
 
113 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2323 (2001). 
114    Id. at 2327–28. 
115 Id. (“[E]ven if Congress has not . . . [chosen to insulate an official from the President’s at-
will removal authority], it should be able, as an alternate means of ensuring a measure of 
independence, to limit the President’s directive authority . . . .”).  But see id. at 2323 n.306 
(“It is possible to argue . . . that Congress must choose between limiting the President’s 
removal power and giving him plenary control over administrative officials . . . .”). 
116 Id. at 2326–27 (“If Congress, in a particular statute, has stated its intent with respect to 
presidential involvement, then that is the end of the matter.  But, if Congress, as it usually 
does, simply has assigned discretionary authority to an agency official, without in any way 
commenting on the President’s role in the delegation, then an interpretive question aris-
es. . . . When the delegation in question runs to members of an independent agency . . . .  
Congress has acted . . . to insulate agency decisionmaking from the President’s influ-
ence. . . . When the delegation runs to an executive branch official, however, Congress’s 
intent . . . may well cut in the opposite direction.”). 
Oct. 2011] CONSTITUTIONAL IN NAME 299 
 
will have executive order authority before the confirmation of a per-
manent Director, but will not have such authority thereafter.  If this 
were indeed the case, the President would have no incentive to ap-
point a permanent Director, for it would result in him abdicating his 
power to influence the Bureau—a situation clearly outside the con-
ceivable realm of Congressional intent.  As such, the Act seems to 
present an instance where Justice Kagan’s rule of interpretation is in-
applicable, and the ability of the President to remove the interim 
head of the agency should not be viewed as also enabling him to issue 
a binding executive order on the Bureau.  Completing the analogy, 
the President should also not have authority to make an appoint-
ment, the effect of which would be to control the interim Director of 
the Bureau. 
To avoid the problems implicated by this second suggested con-
struction of the Act, granting the Treasury Secretary the authority to 
execute the “consumer financial protection functions” transferred to 
the Bureau, I recommend that any reviewing court should instead fol-
low the first suggested interpretation, limiting the Secretary to the 
less worrisome transitional powers described above.  While even this 
may not quell the worries of all constitutional scholars, it at least in 
some way limits the influence that a nonelected official can have on 
issues of national regulatory policy without the confirmation of the 
Senate.  Had the Administration been clearer about its intent in ap-
pointing a “special advisor,” however, such worries may never have 
arisen in the first place. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection has been envi-
sioned by some to be the “first truly 21st century regulatory agency”— 
one that “will be engaged with the community and make use of new 
technology to gather data quickly and put it to use immediately to 
protect consumers.”117  Although the goals of the Bureau may well set 
a healthy precedent for the country’s regulatory agenda moving for-
ward in the century, the manner of the Bureau’s conception and the 
early stages of its life certainly portend trouble for some of adminis-
trative law’s longest established principles.  While Congress and the 
Administration have been careful to stay within the bounds of the 
Court’s nondelegation and Appointments clause doctrines—
 
117 Preeti Vissa, Face-to-Face With Elizabeth Warren:  Envisioning a 21st Century Consumer Agency 
for All Americans, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
preeti-vissa/facetoface-with-elizabeth_b_778396.html. 
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explicitly providing standards and objectives for the Bureau’s rule-
making, and naming Elizabeth Warren as “Special Assistant” rather 
than an “interim Director”—it appears, unfortunately, that they have 
not had equal regard for the motivating spirit behind these laws.  As 
stated at the outset of this Comment, courts are inherently limited in 
their ability to articulate doctrines that fully capture this spirit, and as 
such, the public must be able to trust that its elected officials will en-
deavor to act in accordance with the broader purposes of the law ra-
ther than a court’s mere statement of it.  If the Bureau is indeed the 
prototype of the twenty-first century agency, it seems that this rela-
tionship of trust is in dire need of rehabilitation. 
